In this little non-technical piece, I argue that some of the lessons that can be learnt from the bold action carried out in 1996 by the physicist Alan Sokal and typically known as the "Sokal affair" not only apply to some sector of the humanities (which was the original target of the hoax), but also (with much less intensity, but still) to the hardest sciences.
The reader probably knows about the famous "Sokal affair". This refers to an illuminating action designed and carried out by Alan Sokal in 1996. The physics professor at NYU submitted an article entitled "Transgressing the boundaries: Towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity" to Social Text, a high-impact, well known academic journal of postmodern cultural studies. In Sokal's own words, what he wanted to test was this: "Would a leading North American journal of cultural studies -whose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric Jameson and Andrew Ross-publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions?" (Sokal, 1996a) . That is, he deliberately sent and absurd article which was "a pastiche of left-wing cant, fawning references, grandiose quotations, and outright nonsense. . . structured around the silliest quotations [by postmodernist academics] he could find about mathematics and physics" (Wikipedia, 2013) , an article that he wrote "so that any competent physicist or mathematician (or undergraduate physics or math major) would realize that it is a spoof" (Sokal, 1996a) .
The answer to Sokal's question was (unfortunately for our trust in the collective intelligence of humankind) yes. The article got published in Social Text (Sokal, 1996b) , and he soon denounced it was a hoax in the journal Lingua Franca (Sokal, 1996a) .
The whole business is very interesting and several considerations enter the mix: First, it is important to remark that Sokal is a declared "leftist" (whatever this 1-dimensional classification of political tendencies may mean in these times), and one of his objectives was to denounce the anti-scientific, anti-rationalistic attitude of a large part of the left. This is important, it is also very sad (specially for rationalistic "leftists"), it is as valid now as it was in 1996, but I will not focus on it here.
Another lesson that the Sokal affair teaches us is that believing in things that make us feel good can be dangerous (to say the least). This is explicit in his second point, "(b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions". Why? Because, for most people, confirming preconceptions feels good and contradicting them feels bad.
The lesson is in fact more general than this, since confirming preconceptions is by no means the only way of producing nice warm feelings out of beliefs and intellectual conclusions. The sources are multiple: believing that there is life after death, believing that medicines (such as homeopathy) exist with no secondary effects and capable of curing virtually everything, believing that you are right about a point and most people is wrong (Neil Armstrong didn't go the Moon), and many more, all make people feel good for obvious reasons. Another way of putting it is due to David Albert. In a great interview in which he tries to control the damage of having been inadvertently talked into participating in the shameful film "What the bleep do we know?", he explains that the main difference between the views which science helps us to arrive to and those defended by the Vatican or by the producers and fans of the film is that the second are (and must be!) "therapeutic", while the views suggested by science do not have to be (and typically are not) (Albert, 2012) . Science forces us to be honest to ourselves (when it works well), and this includes not letting warm feelings lead us to "therapeutic" but false conclusions about the world.
Of course, these blatantly obvious concessions to one's feelings are nowhere to be found among successful scientists in the hard sciences, but I think that something more subtle and related to this is in place. No serious scientist will let herself be influenced by not wanting to die, or by the desire of having a cure-it-all medicine; that is too childish. But it is also clear that some pressure exists to arrive to conclusions that, say, confirm what was said in previous publications by the same scientist, that are consistent with the achievements that were promised in the last funding grant, or that do not go too much against the usual way of understanding things in the corresponding field (thus making the peer-review process "smoother"). Depending on the personality of the scientist, these pressures will be enough to lead the discourse to wrong (but convenient) conclusions. . . or not. After all, confirming and thus increasing the importance of one's past results, getting nice grants, and not having to struggle too much with referees suspicious of our heterodoxy does feel good. And scientists are human -despite many opinions on the contrary.
A very nice example is one that Dennett (2009) likes to use. It seems that when "The origin of species" was published a Robert Beverley MacKenzie answered Darwin with a long criticism containing the following paragraph:
But in the Theory with which we have to deal, Absolute Ignorance is the artificer, so that we may enunciate as the fundamental principle of the whole system, that in order TO MAKE A PERFECT AND BEAUTIFUL MACHINE IT IS NOT REQUISITE TO KNOW HOW TO MAKE IT [capital (outraged) letters in the original]. This proposition will be found, on a careful examination, to express in a condensed form the essential purport of the Theory, and to express in a few words all Mr Darwin's meaning; who, by a strange inversion of reasoning, seems to think Absolute Ignorance fully qualified to take the place of Absolute Wisdom in all the achievements of creative skill.
As Dennett says, "Exactly!" This piece of text is one of the most accurate, distilled and insightful descriptions of what Darwin had achieved, thus proving that MacKenzie was a clever fellow who had read the whole treatise and who had understood it thoroughly. However, he not only disagreed, he hated Darwin's conclusion. Why? Because it went against one of the beliefs that he held dearest and which made him good and warm inside: that an intelligent creator was behind life in general and humans in particular.
When doing science, it is convenient to remember Feynman's famous aphorism: "The first principle is that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool" (Feynman, 1999, chap. 10 ) -which is, of course, also applicable to me.
An example much closer to my line of work pertains some analyses of hybrid quantumclassical models in chemical physics. I will not go so far as to state that the authors of the corresponding papers are guilty of "fooling themselves" with respect to their quantitative conclusions (after all, the conclusions tend to be numerically validated, and rigorously so). But I cannot help realizing the uncritical way in which some ill-defined and even false statements are repeated and (it seems) carried forward from one introduction to the next. For example, in the otherwise excellent review by (Truhlar, 2007) (and by no means only there) we can find the statement that Ehrenfest evolution is unitary -which, being non-linear, is obviously not (Alonso et al., 2011 (Alonso et al., , 2012 . I think that this should make us a bit suspicious about the hypotheses from which these papers start, and maybe also about the interpretation of the quantitative results. Of course, the same caution should be exercised if we catch ourselves repeating something uncritically. Nobody is free from making this kind of mistakes.
A third lesson that we can learn from Sokal's hoax is emphasized in the book he later wrote together with Jean Bricmont (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998) , namely, that postmodernist writers like to misuse scientific and mathematical concepts to support their "arguments" (e.g., a given postmodernist argued that the famous equation E = mc 2 is a "sexed equation" because "it privileges the speed of light over other speeds that are vitally necessary to us").
Again, this is an extreme (and funny!) case of a much more general practice. It is common that all kinds of thinkers use concepts from a "more fundamental" (or just different) field to sound more clever and attach more weight to their arguments. The trick is very simple in its workings: Since you write mostly for your colleagues (who work in the same field as you), it is very likely that they do not understand very well the borrowed concepts that you are planning to use. However, they are not certain that you don't understand them either (hey, maybe you spent your last sabbatical reading about formal logic, who knows). Hence, if you use the concepts with gravity and (apparent) self-assurance, they might think that you know what you mean, and (not knowing formal logic) they will probably assent silently. Try it, it works! As I say, this is a common pitfall in scientific discourses and it is not always so obvious and ridiculous as in postmodernist papers. Normally, the discipline from which the borrowed concepts come from is very close to the one in which the author is an expert, thus making the bona fide assumption that she knows what she means more reasonable. Also, since the borrowed concepts are in fact close, the author might misuse them, but only slightly. She is not an expert, but she is not completely alien to them either.
I claim here that theoretical physicists (including myself) are sometimes guilty of this kind of slight misuses related to philosophical, mathematical or biological concepts; mathematicians borrow gaily from physics; biologists from physics and chemistry; and theoretical chemists from quantum physics and mathematics.
Finally, in my opinion probably the greatest warning coming from the Sokal affair is related to the dangers of using ambiguous and vague language. One of the points that Sokal and Bricmont (1998) discuss in their book is indeed "manipulating words and phrases that are, in fact, meaningless" or the use of "deliberately obscure language", but my content is that this is not again something circumscribed to the most absurd postmodernist texts only. This is a practice which is all-pervading; and not only in science, but in society as a whole. It fact, it is in science where the greatest efforts have been made to sharpen the language, to be precise, to deal with unique meanings, to disambiguate natural words, and I think that this is one of the main reasons behind the enormous achievements of our scientific and technological society (the scientific method: yes; the aforementioned honest approach to nature: yes; the precise language: no doubt, too).
You see, if a word has three (or twenty!) possible meanings and we do not start by declaring with care and precision which one of them we are thinking about, it is very likely that I am using one of the meanings and you are using a different one. If the discourse contains not only one such word but many of them, the odds that we do not understand each other are very high. We will very probably end talking past each other or, in the best of cases, we will strongly disagree and we will be amazed how the other person can possibly hold such absurd beliefs about the world. If we also include the possibility that some of the words' meanings have blurred boundaries (bald, tall, teenager) , that some words have no meaning at all (chakra, aura, karma, luck), or we accept composed concepts made of words that have meaning independently but it is destroyed upon combination (quantum healing, negative vibrations), then you can imagine how bad the situation can get. Many conversations are like this in everyday life and, unfortunately, also in science (as I say, to a much lower degree, but still). Even in quantum mechanics, one of the finest theories ever created by us humans, many conceptual problems have survived for almost a century very likely due (in part) to the use of ambiguous language in its very axiomatic foundations (Bricmont, 2013 , Echenique-Robba, 2013 . In this case, the word "measure" seems to be the likely culprit.
It takes a lot of work to try to be as precise as possible in every sentence, in every word, but I think it is worth the effort. I think it is better to write less, to publish less, but to think deeper. To stop and ask ourselves from time to time: "What do I really mean with 'wordX' ? Am I sure that I am using it properly? Am I sure that I can define it sharply and neatly?" I think that being extremely careful with the meaning of words is not just being picky and wasting others' time, but it can serve to prove that some widely accepted hypotheses are wrong, and to arrive to new and applicable results.
The lessons of the "Sokal affair" do not apply to cultural studies only, but also to science.
